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Course Allocation via Stable Matching
Different approaches for course allocation with a focus on appropriate stable matching
mechanisms are surveyed. The Gale-Shapley student optimal stable mechanism (SOSM)
and the efficiency adjusted deferred acceptance mechanism (EADAM) are discussed in
detail. EADAM can be seen as a fundamental recent contribution which recovers efficiency
losses from SOSM at the expense of strategy-proofness. In addition to these two important
mechanisms, a survey of recent extensions with respect to the assignment of schedules of
courses rather than individual courses is provided. The survey of the theoretical literature is
complemented with results of a field experiment, which help understand the benefits of
stable matching mechanisms in course allocation applications.
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1 Introduction
The Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic
Science in 2012 was awarded to Alvin E.
Roth and Lloyd S. Shapley for “the the-
ory of stable allocations and the practice
of market design” as the Royal Swedish
Academy of Sciences put it. Market de-
sign is an academic field at the inter-
section of computer science, economics,
and the management sciences, concerned
with the design of market institutions
(Roth 2002; Milgrom 2011), with many
recent contributions from the Informa-
tion Systems community (for example
Weinhardt et al. 2003; Bapna et al. 2004;
Bichler et al. 2009).
Roth and Shapley were recognized for
their work on stable matching between
two sets of elements given preferences of
each element over the other set. Those
sets could be students and courses for ex-
ample, and in contrast to auction mar-
kets no monetary transfers are allowed.
A matching is stable, if there does not ex-
ist any alternative pairing in which both
students and course organizers are bet-
ter off. The problem of computing a sta-
ble matching is different from that of
computing a maximum weight bipar-
tite matching in the assignment prob-
lem, which is regularly taught in com-
puter and management science. Gale and
Shapley (1962) presented one of the
most commonly used two-sided match-
ing models, the marriage model, which
matches a single man to a single woman
(one-to-one). They suggested the Gale-
Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm to
find a stable matching.
Gale and Shapley (1962) show that,
when preferences are strict, the deferred
acceptance algorithm yields the unique
stable matching in O(n2) time that
is Pareto superior to any other stable
matching from the viewpoint of the stu-
dents. Therefore, the outcome of the stu-
dent proposing deferred acceptance al-
gorithm is also called the student opti-
mal stable matching and the mechanism
that associates the student optimal sta-
ble matching to any one-to-many match-
ing problem as it can be found in school
choice or college admission is known
as the student optimal stable mechanism
(SOSM). The underlying concept is the
same as in the one-to-one Gale-Shapley
deferred acceptance algorithm. Besides
the fact that it gives the most efficient sta-
ble matching, another appealing feature
of the SOSM is that it is strategy-proof
(Roth 1982). Strategy-proofness means
that no student has an incentive to misre-
port his or her true preferences and stu-
dents have dominant strategies, clearly a
very desirable property.
Although SOSM is strategy-proof and
stable, the matching is not necessarily
Pareto efficient, which is another im-
portant design desideratum. Only re-
cently, Kesten (2010) proposed the ef-
ficiency adjusted (EADAM) that allows
for stability and Pareto efficiency at the
expense of strategy-proofness. However,
truth telling of students is a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium in this mechanism.
Even if there are no dominant strategies,
possibilities to strategically misrepresent
preferences are minimal in most applica-
tions. EADAM can be seen as a significant
contribution to the literature. Apart from
EADAM there have been a number of re-
cent contributions with respect to the as-
signment of bundles of courses to a single
student, and the theory of matching has
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drawn quite a bit of recent academic at-
tention with many open problems which
can be considered fundamental for Eco-
nomics and the Management Sciences in
general.
In this paper, we will focus on the one-
to-many matching problem in the con-
text of course allocation, as it is a wide-
spread problem in higher education and
beyond. We will discuss prime candi-
dates for the solution of this problem
and complement this survey with results
from a field study, in which we com-
pare two stable matching mechanisms
to a first-come-first-served (FCFS) mech-
anism, a standard mechanism in many
institutions. Given the widespread appli-
cation of FCFS, it is interesting to un-
derstand the impact of stable matching
mechanisms over FCFS in terms of sta-
bility and efficiency. As far as we know,
our field studies are the first to analyze
EADAM in a real-world application, and
we are also not aware of any empirical
work comparing stable matching mecha-
nisms such as SOSM or EADAM to FCFS.
Apart from strategic properties of mecha-
nisms such as strategy-proofness and sta-
bility, these field experiments shed light
on secondary desiderata such as the av-
erage rank of students or the rank distri-
bution that result from stable matching
mechanisms and the incumbent FCFS.
Note that we do not consider time tabling
problems or capacity management with
respect to rooms available in a school, be-
cause such decisions are typically made
before students register for one course or
another.
In Sect. 2 we will introduce stable
matching and discuss various applica-
tions to provide an introduction to the
field. In Sect. 3, we formally introduce
the course allocation problem and pro-
vide relevant design desiderata as well as a
succinct description of SOSM, EADAM,
and FCFS. Section 4 introduces data and
the results of two field experiments. This
provides an understanding of how such
mechanisms can be evaluated in prac-
tice and how the outcomes of FCFS dif-
fer from those of stable matching mech-
anisms. In Sect. 5 we discuss recent liter-
ature on the allocation of course sched-
ules, before we conclude the paper in
Sect. 6.
2 Stable Matching and Its
Applications
We will first give an overview of typi-
cal problems and successful applications
before we focus on course allocation in
more detail. In particular, the school
choice problem has drawn a lot of atten-
tion and it shares many similarities with
course allocation. In order to give par-
ents the opportunity to choose the pub-
lic school their child will attend, many
U.S. states provide school choice systems.
Each prospective student submits a list
of preferences of schools to the central
placement authority of the school dis-
trict. On the other hand each school has
a priority ordering of all students and
a maximum capacity. This information
is used to determine which student will
be assigned to which school. Abdulka-
dirog˘lu and Sönmez (2003) showed that
matching mechanisms that have been in
use in the U.S. did not perform well in
terms of efficiency, incentives, and stabil-
ity. As a consequence, the Boston Pub-
lic Schools replaced a priority mechanism
(the Boston mechanism) with a deferred
acceptance mechanism in 2005. Abdulka-
dirog˘lu et al. (2006) present further ar-
guments against the Boston mechanism.
This mechanism does not exhibit a dom-
inant strategy equilibrium and it is not
stable. Some experimental work has fo-
cused on school choice comparing these
two approaches. For example, in Chen
and Sönmez (2006), experimental sub-
jects play a one-shot game of incomplete
information in which each participant
is only informed about his own prefer-
ences, schools’ capacities, and the match-
ing mechanism. They find that from the
perspective of students, the SOSM out-
performs both the Boston mechanism
and other alternatives. Featherstone and
Niederle (2008) confirm this, but also
discuss settings with only private infor-
mation of subjects, where the Boston
mechanism has advantages.
In Germany, the assignment of stu-
dents to universities via the “Zentral-
stelle für die Vergabe von Studienplätzen”
(ZVS) is a large-scale application of
matching. One part of the capacity is re-
served for excellent students and students
with long waiting times via a Boston
mechanism. The remaining places are al-
located on the basis of universities’ pref-
erences via a university-proposing Gale-
Shapley deferred acceptance mechanism.
The two parts are administered sequen-
tially in the aforementioned order (West-
kamp 2013). Braun et al. (2007) present
evidence from the field that some appli-
cants behave strategically and not truth-
fully in this combined mechanism. An-
other widely cited application of one-to-
many stable matching is the assignment
of graduating medical students to their
first hospital appointments by the Na-
tional Resident Match Program in the
U.S. (Roth 1984). A number of other ap-
plications can be found online (http://
www.matching-in-practice.eu/).
The Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance
mechanism has dominated the stable
matching literature for many years and
most comparisons are with the Boston
mechanism, probably driven by the
school choice problem. The outcomes
of both mechanisms are not necessarily
Pareto efficient, however. Unfortunately,
Kesten (2010) shows that there cannot
exist a mechanism that can in every case
return a Pareto optimal as well as stable
matching.
There are Pareto efficient and strategy-
proof (but not stable) mechanisms for
school choice proposed by Abdulka-
dirog˘lu and Sönmez (2003), which are
based on the top trading cycle algorithm
(Shapley and Scarf 1974). This mecha-
nism enables a student to obtain a higher
priority at a desirable school by trading
his or her priority for a less desirable
school with another student. In the con-
text of school choice problems, the idea
of trading priorities has been perceived
as a problem. Alternatively, a simple ran-
dom serial dictatorship can be used, where
students are randomly ordered and then
assigned to their first preference among
the remaining schools. This mechanism
is also efficient and strategy-proof, but
not stable. Similar to the top trading cy-
cle, it has not been used for school choice
or college admission as far as we know.
Roth (2002) argues, based on empirical
observations, that stability is a key fea-
ture of successful matching mechanisms
in practice.
Gale and Shapley (1962) showed that
the deferred acceptance algorithm leads
to stable matchings if preferences are
strict and complete. In practice, prefer-
ence lists might be incomplete and the
schools that are not on the preference
list of a student might just not be ac-
ceptable to a student. Such problems can
be accommodated by a version of SOSM
(Manlove et al. 2002). It might also be
the case that there are ties in the pref-
erences or that unlisted schools have the
lowest preference for students and they
are tied but acceptable. A common prac-
tice in case of ties is to randomly break
the ties. Erdil and Ergin (2008) show that
there can be efficiency losses by SOSM
when ties in priorities are broken in some
random way. They introduce one mecha-
nism that restores such artificial welfare
98 Business & Information Systems Engineering 2|2014
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losses. EADAM is an alternative way to
recover welfare losses originating from
random tie-breaking, which is another
appealing feature of the mechanism and
a reason, why we discuss it in this paper.
Note that there are also related ver-
sions of the stable matching problem
that are computationally hard. For ex-
ample, if there are ties, the preferences
are incomplete, and the schools which
are not listed are unacceptable, then find-
ing a maximum cardinality stable match-
ing is an NP-complete problem (Manlove
et al. 2002). Related work has looked
into approximation algorithms for hard
stable matching problems (Halldórsson
et al. 2003). We will not discuss ques-
tions on computational complexity fur-
ther in this paper. In our field studies be-
low, we assume the preferences of stu-
dents to be strict and courses not ranked
by the students are considered unaccept-
able. We also refer the interested reader
to Manlove (2013) for a comprehensive
study of algorithmic aspects of matching
problems.
Although the course allocation prob-
lem is similar to school choice it has not
received as much attention in the liter-
ature, and different mechanisms are be-
ing used in practice. We are not aware
of applications of the Boston mecha-
nism, random serial dictatorship, or the
top-trading cycle for course allocation,
for example. Typically, monetary trans-
fers are not allowed for course assign-
ment in higher education, thus auctions
are not an option. However, some busi-
ness schools in the USA use course bid-
ding, where students are given a bid en-
dowment in a virtual currency to allocate
across the courses they consider taking.
This virtual currency does not have out-
side value and there are various possibili-
ties for manipulation (Sönmez and Ünver
2010; Krishna and Ünver 2008). Krishna
and Ünver (2005) report on a field ex-
periment with 535 students, comparing
course bidding with the Gale-Shapley sta-
ble matching mechanism and find that
the latter could vastly improve efficiency.
3 Course Allocation Problem
Similar to school choice, one can ar-
gue that stability is a desirable feature
of course allocation mechanisms (Roth
2002). We want to discuss the relative
merits of stable matching mechanisms
for course allocation in this paper and
compare them to FCFS. For this we
will define the course allocation prob-
Table 1 Course organizer preferences (c) and student preferences (s) for
Example 1. Underlined preferences describe a matching
c1 c2 c3 c4 s1 s2 s3 s4
s4 s2 s3 s1 c1 c1 c2 c3
s1 s3 s4
.
.
. c4 c2 c3 c1
s2
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
lem more formally in the next section
and discuss prime candidates for stable
course allocation mechanisms, as well as
the FCFS procedure.
3.1 Matchings, Matching Mechanisms,
and Their Properties
A course allocation problem consists of a
finite set of students S ≡ {s1, s2, . . . , sn}
and a finite set of courses C ≡ {c1, c2,
. . . , cm} with the maximum capacities q =
(qc1 ,qc2 , . . . ,qcm). To ensure that a fea-
sible matching exists we assume qc ≥ 0
for all c ∈ C and n ≤ ∑c∈C qc . Each stu-
dent has a preference relation s over
the courses C (called student prefer-
ences), and each course (organizer) has
a preference relation c over the stu-
dents S (called course organizer prefer-
ences). These are essentially priority or-
derings of the course organizer over the
students, which means that the course or-
ganizers will not be considered as strate-
gic. We will assume strict preferences al-
though SOSM and EADAM can be easily
extended to the case of indifferences.
The vectors for these relations are de-
noted S = (s)s∈S and C = (c)c∈C .
Let P denote the set of all possible pref-
erence relations over C and P |S| the set of
all preference vectors for all students.
Definition 1 (Matching) A matching is
a mapping μ of students S to courses C
that satisfies:
(i) μ(s) ∈ C for all s ∈ S
(ii) μ−1(c) ⊆ S for all c ∈ C, and
(iii) for any s ∈ S and c ∈ C, we have
μ(s) = c if and only if s ∈ μ−1(c)
A matching is feasible if |μ−1(c)| ≤ qc
for all c ∈ C, which means that no course
is overcrowded. The following simple Ex-
ample 1 adapted from Kesten (2010)
should illustrate these definitions.
Example 1 Consider the course alloca-
tion problem with four students S ≡ {s1,
s2, s3, s4} and four courses C ≡ {c1, c2,
c3, c4}, each course having one seat. The
course organizer preferences (c) and
the student preferences (s) are given in
Table 1.
One desirable property of matchings is
Pareto efficiency such that no student can
be made better off without making any
other student worse off.
Definition 2 (Pareto efficiency of match-
ings) A matching μ is Pareto efficient
with respect to the students if there is
no other feasible matching μ′ such that
μ′(s) s μ(s) for all students s ∈ S and
μ′(s) s μ(s) for some s ∈ S.
Stability means, that there should be no
unmatched pair of a student and a course
(s, c) where student s prefers course c
to her current assignment and she has
higher priority than some other student
who is assigned to course c. Stability can
be seen as capturing no justified envy.
Definition 3 (Stability) A matching μ is
stable if μ(s′) s μ(s) implies s′ μ(s′) s
for all s, s′ ∈ S.
Next we will discuss mechanisms to
compute matchings and their properties.
A mechanism returns a matching for
given preferences of students and courses.
More formally, let M denote the set of
all feasible matchings. A matching mech-
anism χ can be described as a function
χ : P |S| → M that returns a feasible
matching of students to courses for ev-
ery preference profile of the students. For
a submitted preference profile S∈ P |S|
of the students, χ(S) is the associated
matching. For a student s the assigned
course is χs(S) ∈ C. For a course c the
set of the assigned students is χc(S) ⊆ S.
A mechanism is Pareto efficient if it al-
ways selects a Pareto-efficient matching.
Also, a mechanism is stable if it always se-
lects a stable matching. Another impor-
tant property of a mechanism is strategy-
proofness. This means, that there is no in-
centive for any student not to submit her
truthful preferences, no matter what the
other students submit.
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Table 2 Example of the serial dictator-
ship mechanism
Step Student to
be assigned
c1 c2 c3 c4
1 s2 s2
2 s1
.
.
. s1
3 s3
.
.
. s3
.
.
.
4 s4 s2 s3 s4 s1
Definition 4 (Strategy-proofness) A
mechanism χ is strategy-proof if for
any S ∈ P |S| with s ∈ S and ′s ∈ P we
have χs(S)s χs(′s,S\{s}).
χs(′s,S\{s}) describes the preference
profile, where the preferences of stu-
dent s, ′s, differ from his true pref-
erences s. Unfortunately, there exists
no strategy-proof matching mechanisms
that is both efficient and stable (Kesten
2010).
For an illustration of the above def-
initions, we will introduce the random
serial dictatorship mechanism, which is
arguably one of the simplest matching
mechanisms.
Algorithm 1 Draw uniformly at random
a permutation π of {1,2, . . . ,n} of the
students in S. For x from 1 to n = |S| as-
sign student cπ(x) to his or her top choice
among the remaining slots.
Consider the permutation
π =
(
1 2 3 4
2 1 3 4
)
which could be the result of a lottery.
This would lead to the following order-
ing of the students (s2, s1, s3, s4). Then
the mechanism would work as described
in Table 2.
The matching
μ1 =
(
c1 c2 c3 c4
s2 s3 s4 s1
)
would be the result. This result is under-
lined in Table 1.
The random serial dictatorship mecha-
nism is Pareto efficient and strategy-proof,
which is straightforward to see. Unfortu-
nately, the mechanism is not stable, as the
following shows. Student s1 and course c1
are unmatched, where student s1 prefers
course c1 to her current assignment (c4)
Table 3 Course organizer preferences (c) and student preferences (s) for
Example 2
c1 c2 c3 c4 s1 s2 s3 s4
s4 s2 s3 s1 c1 c1 c2 c3
s1 s3 s4
.
.
. c4 c2 c3 c1
s2
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
and she has higher priority to c1 than stu-
dent s2 who is assigned to course c1. By
setting s = s1 and s′ = s2 we get
c1 = μ(s2) = μ
(
s′
) s1 μ(s) = μ(s1) = c4
and
s2 = s′ ≺c1 s = s1,
contradicting the definition of stability.
Another disadvantage of random serial
dictatorship is that course-specific priori-
ties are not possible because there is only
one single ordering of the students for all
courses.
In the following subsections, we de-
scribe stable matching mechanisms to
solve the course allocation problem.
SOSM is well known, while the EADAM
is a more recent approach, which gives
up on strategy-proofness for a weaker
game-theoretical solution concept, that
of a Bayes-Nash equilibrium, to gain ef-
ficiency. Then we will briefly introduce
FCFS as it is used in many universities.
3.2 Gale-Shapley Student-Optimal
Stable Mechanism (SOSM)
The Gale-Shapley student-optimal stable
mechanism (SOSM) is a modified ver-
sion of the Gale-Shapley deferred accep-
tance algorithm from (Gale and Shap-
ley 1962), which allows for one-to-many
assignments. This algorithm works as
follows:
Algorithm 2
Step 1: Each student applies to his or
her first choice course. For each course
c with a capacity qc , those qc proposers
who have the highest priority for c are
tentatively assigned to c, the remaining
proposers are rejected.
In general, at
Step k, k ≥ 2: Each student who was
rejected in the previous step (k − 1) ap-
plies to his or her next choice course. For
each course c, from the new proposers
and those who were tentatively assigned
at a previous step, the qc with the highest
priority are tentatively assigned to c, the
rest is rejected.
The algorithm terminates when no
student is rejected any more.
Example 2 Consider the problem given
in Example 1.
The steps of the algorithm applied to
this problem are shown in Table 4. The
students that are tentatively assigned to
a course are shown in a box, the rejected
students are not shown in a box.
The resulting matching is
μ2 =
(
c1 c2 c3 c4
s4 s2 s3 s1
)
and is underlined in Table 3.
As the name suggests, SOSM is stable
(see Gale and Shapley 1962 for the proof)
and strategy-proof (Abdulkadirog˘lu and
Sönmez 2003). It is used in the public
school systems of Boston and New York
City, and both properties were used as an
argument to switch to this mechanism.
One can easily verify, however, that the
matching μ2 is not Pareto efficient. If
the students s2, s3, and s4 would be as-
signed to their course of first choice and
s1 would not be changed, then three stu-
dents would be better off. This means,
that SOSM may produce welfare losses
on the students’ side and these losses
can be significant. The top trading cy-
cle algorithm is an alternative algorithm,
which is strategy-proof and efficient, but
not stable (Abdulkadirog˘lu and Sönmez
Table 4 Example of the Gale-Shapley
student-optimal stable mechanism
Step c1 c2 c3 c4
1 s1 , s2 s3 s4
2
.
.
. s2 , s3
.
.
.
3
.
.
. s3 , s4
4 s4 , s1
.
.
.
5 s4 s2 s3 s1
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2003), but in school choice applications
stability has typically been preferred over
efficiency.
The Boston mechanism is another al-
gorithm that has been used for school
choice. It works as follows. Let us assume
that there are m schools. For rounds
k = 1 to m it does the following: in each
round k, those students who have not
been allocated a place yet are consid-
ered for allocation at their k-th most pre-
ferred school. The places are allocated ac-
cording to the priorities of the schools,
as long as capacity is not used up. By
the end of round m, each student has
been allocated a space at a school. The
Boston mechanism is manipulable and
truthful revelation is not a dominant
strategy (Abdulkadirog˘lu and Sönmez
2003). Multiple sources discuss strategies
that yield better outcomes than truth-
telling, such as not ranking unachiev-
able courses (Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. 2006).
Also the EADAM mechanism introduced
in the next subsection does not provide
strategy-proofness, but truth-telling is a
Bayes-Nash equilibrium strategy.
3.3 Efficiency Adjusted Deferred
Acceptance Mechanism (EADAM)
Kesten (2010) introduced a matching
mechanism, which reduces welfare losses
on the student side as described above,
but gives up on strategy-proofness. If we
again look at Example 2, we can see that
there is a rejection chain from step 1 to 4,
which is initiated by student s1 at course
c1 who rejects s2 in step 1.
This rejection induces the rejections at
steps 2, 3, and 4, where s1 is rejected from
course c1. Student s1 does not benefit
from being tentatively assigned to course
c1 from step 1 to step 4 and only hurts
the other students (s2, s3, and s4). Hence,
Kesten calls any student like s1 an inter-
rupter and a pair like (s1, c1) an interrupt-
ing pair. If student s1 would waive his pri-
ority for the critical course c1, then the
other students would be assigned to their
first choice course.
Definition 5 (Interrupter; Kesten 2010)
Given a problem to which the DA algo-
rithm is applied, let s be a student who
is tentatively placed on course c at some
Step t and rejected from it at some later
Step t′. If there is at least one other stu-
dent who is rejected from course c after
Step t − 1 and before Step t′, i.e., rejected
at a step l ∈ {t, t + 1, . . . , t′ − 1}, then we
call student s an interrupter for course c,
Table 5 Course organizer preferences (c) and updated student preferences (s)
for Example 3
c1 c2 c3 c4 s1 s2 s3 s4
s4 s2 s3 s1 c1 c1 c2 c3
s1 s3 s4
.
.
.
c4 c2 c3 c1
s2
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
and the pair (s, c) an interrupting pair of
Step t′.
The following Algorithm 3 describes
the above mechanism.
Algorithm 3 (Kesten 2010)
Step 0: Run the DA algorithm.
Step 1: Find the last step (of the DA al-
gorithm run in Step 0) at which a con-
senting interrupter is rejected from the
course for which he is an interrupter.
Identify all interrupting pairs of that step
each of which contains a consenting in-
terrupter. If there are no interrupting
pairs, then stop. For each identified in-
terrupting pair (s, c), remove course c
from the preferences of student s without
changing the relative order of the remain-
ing courses. Re-run the DA algorithm
with the new preference profile.
In general,
Step t, t ≥ 2: Find the last step (of
the DA algorithm run in Step t − 1) at
which a consenting interrupter is rejected
from the course for which he is an in-
terrupter. Identify all interrupting pairs
of that step, each of which contains a
consenting interrupter. If there are no
interrupting pairs, then stop. For each
identified interrupting pair (s, c) remove
course c from the preferences of stu-
dent s without changing the relative or-
der of the remaining courses. Re-run the
DA algorithm with the new preference
profile.
Example 3 Again, we look at the prob-
lem given in Example 1, assuming for
simplicity that all students consent.
Step 0: See Example 2.
Step 1: Since student s1 is rejected from
course c1 at Step 4 and since student s2
has been rejected from course c1 while
student s1 was tentatively assigned to
course c1, we identify (s1, c1) as the last
and the only interrupting pair. Suppose
student s1 consents. Then we remove
course c1 from student s1’s preferences
and re-run the DA algorithm with the
new preference profile shown in Table 5.
Table 6 Example of the efficiency ad-
justed deferred acceptance mechanism
Step c1 c2 c3 c4
1 s2 s3 s4 s1
The resulting matching is
μ3 =
(
c1 c2 c3 c4
s2 s3 s4 s1
)
.
The outcomes of SOSM (underlined) and
EADAM (in boxes) are shown in Tables 5
and 6 resp. Kesten (2010) also describes a
straightforward extension for the match-
ing with indifferences. While EADAM is
not strategy-proof, speculation is diffi-
cult and truth-telling is a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium.
3.4 First-Come-First-Served Course
Allocation System (FCFS)
Other than the two prominent stable
matching mechanisms, we introduce a
simple first-come-first-served course allo-
cation system used at many universities.
During the application period students
can sign up to exactly one course wher-
ever free places are available, based on
their time of arrival after the registration
time starts. Changing the course assign-
ment later is only possible after the ex-
isting course assignment is canceled by
a student. Sometimes students just can-
not be the first to register due to circum-
stances beyond their control and the out-
come might be unstable and inefficient.
Also, the registration process for groups
of courses is often ordered sequentially,
such that students have to decide in one
period whether they register for a par-
ticular set of courses or wait for a later
period with a course of higher priority.
Now, students need to speculate on their
probability of getting a seat in a more
popular course with a later registration
time, or if they should rather register for
a less preferred course early.
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4 Field Experiments
Apart from the theoretical properties
of the matching mechanisms described
above, it is interesting to understand
which differences in the outcome can be
expected in the field. In what follows,
we will discuss the data elicitation for
field experiments and introduce the met-
rics, which allow for the comparison of
outcomes.
4.1 Data Collection
We collected preferences from students
for two courses in the summer term 2012
and the winter term 2012/13.
The first field experiment was on a lec-
ture with 141 students, who had to be as-
signed to 8 courses with a capacity of 17
seats each. The students provided their
preferences in the FCFS system and their
ordinal preferences in a second system
at about the same time. The comparison
was only done with respect to the 136
students who provided their preferences
in both systems. The students were told
about SOSM and the fact that the mecha-
nism is strategy-proof, and we would de-
cide randomly on the outcome of one
of the systems to finally determine the
assignment.
We used the same data to compute
efficient matchings in EADAM. While
EADAM is not strategy-proof for stu-
dents, truth-telling is an ordinal Bayesian
Nash equilibrium and we suspect that
students would not be able to game the
mechanism strategically in such an en-
vironment. So, when we compute the
EADAM outcomes, we assume that the
students would also provide their pref-
erences truthfully and consent to waive
a certain priority since a consenting stu-
dent causes himself no harm in EADAM.
Figure 1 shows the histogram of the
number of preferences the students sub-
mitted. For instance 26 students submit-
ted 3 preferences for the courses. We
can also see that 63 students submitted
preferences for all 8 courses.
The second field experiment in the sum-
mer term 2012 was carried out on a large
class with 794 students in total, and the
students provided their preferences for 45
lab courses taking place at different times
of the week. After the students registered
in the first weeks of the semester in the
FCFS system, we asked them to provide
their preferences in an ordinal ranking
within the subsequent 3 weeks. The sizes
Fig. 1 Histogram of
number of preferences of
the students in the first field
experiment
Fig. 2 Histogram of number of preferences of the students in the second field
experiment
of the courses range from 14 to 22 stu-
dents restricted by the room sizes. The
45 courses had a capacity of 858 course
spaces.
The lecture was very large and for or-
ganizational reasons, we could not elicit
all preferences as was possible in the first
field experiment. Overall, 418 of the 794
students provided their ordinal prefer-
ences, and only those students who pro-
vided their preferences and who were
matched in the FCFS system were con-
sidered in the comparison. As a conse-
quence, the group size of the courses was
reduced proportionally by 418858 = 0,49 ≈
1
2 to allow for a comparison of the two
approaches.
As indicated in the last section, in the
FCFS system the students can often only
register for groups of courses one after
the other. This is done with large classes
to avoid overload of the system. The reg-
istration process in this study began at
4 different points in time. The courses
were classified by the weekday they were
held. The time difference between these 4
points was 2 hours each. This can lead to
speculation, where students register for a
group at an earlier time to prevent not
getting a seat in any group.
The histogram of the number of prefer-
ences the students submitted in the sec-
ond field experiment is shown in Fig. 2.
10 students submitted preferences for all
45 courses. The 45 courses for this large
class were distributed over 18 time slots
with up to 5 courses. Although we could
not elicit all student preferences for this
experiment for organizational reasons,
we believe that the data provides another
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valuable observation and an estimate on
how well stable matching performs in
comparison to an FCFS approach for
large course allocation problems.
4.2 Generation of Course Organizers
Preferences
In both real applications, course organiz-
ers did not use preferences on the as-
signment of students to different courses.
We also wanted to get an understand-
ing of the differences between SOSM
and EADAM in case course organizers
have preferences. In our department such
preferences typically concern the branch
of study, the grades of a student, and the
pre-courses that were taken. In order to
compare the matching mechanisms with
preferences of course organizers we gen-
erated preferences of course organizers
with indifferences across groups of stu-
dents in four different ways, which are
common in our application domain.
First, we know the branch of study
(Computer Science (CS), Information
Systems (IS), Mathematics, and Business)
of all students participating in the ex-
periments. In order to introduce realis-
tic correlation among the student and
the course organizer preferences we first
looked at the top five student preferences
for the different types of study. Depend-
ing on that we generated the type of
study preferences for the courses. For ex-
ample, the course organizer of a course
that is very popular among IS students
would prefer IS students with a higher
likelihood.
A second possibility for generating
course organizers preferences are pre-
courses, that are desired prerequisites for
certain courses. We assumed there to be
five pre-courses that we determined for
all of the courses according to the actual
prerequisites. Based on real distributions
on the taken pre-courses for the differ-
ent types of study at our department we
assigned the pre-courses to the students
depending on their type of study. For in-
stance a CS student has a higher probabil-
ity to have taken a CS pre-course than a
Business student. On the course organiz-
ers’ side we randomly assigned the pre-
courses according to the distribution of
types of study in a course. As we had
more CS students than Math students,
more CS pre-course attendees were as-
signed to the courses. A course organizer
prefers those students who have taken
pre-courses for his or her course.
Table 7 Comparison of student average rank of SOSM and EADAM
Student SOSM EADAM
Assigned
course
Rank of
assigned course
Assigned
course
Rank of
assigned course
s1 c4 2 c4 2
s2 c2 2 c1 1
s3 c3 2 c2 1
s4 c1 2 c3 1
Average rank 2 1.25
Table 8 Comparison of course average rank of SOSM and EADAM
Course SOSM EADAM
Assigned
student
Rank of
assigned student
Assigned
student
Rank of
assigned student
c1 s4 1 s2 3
c2 s2 1 s3 2
c3 s3 1 s4 2
c4 s1 1 s1 1
Average rank 1 2
Third, we generated course organiz-
ers’ preferences by looking at the grades
of students. As we do not have the real
grades of the students available due to
privacy restrictions, we took the real dis-
tribution of average grades in our depart-
ment and assigned grades to the students
according to this distribution. Course or-
ganizers prefer higher grades across all
courses, so their preferences are all the
same in this case.
Finally, we generated combined prefer-
ences by first assigning pre-course pref-
erences to a course. Ties were broken
by branch of study and then by grade.
We will report on the mean of 400 runs
with different course organizer prefer-
ences, 100 for each method described
above. This appears to be a likely type
of preferences in our matching applica-
tions.
4.3 Metrics for Matchings
In order to compare matching mecha-
nisms, we will now introduce three met-
rics that allow for a comparison of the
empirical results.
4.3.1 Average Rank
Using the information on the ranks the
students (courses) achieved is a standard
way of gauging the welfare of the stu-
dents (courses). In particular, the average
rank has been used as a metric to gauge
the difference in welfare of matching al-
gorithms in Budish and Cantillon (2012)
and Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (2009), two of
the few experimental papers on match-
ing mechanisms. The following two ta-
bles show a comparison of SOSM (Ex-
ample 2) and EADAM (Example 3) for
students (Table 7) and courses (Table 8).
The average rank for a single course
with multiple seats is the average of the
ranks of its assigned students. The aver-
age overall course rank is the mean of the
average ranks per course.
4.3.2 Popularity
As defined in Abraham et al. (2007), a
matching μ′ is more popular than another
matching μ (μ′  μ), if the number of
students (courses) that prefer μ′ to μ ex-
ceeds the number of students (courses)
that prefer μ to μ′. The preference of
a course or student is the sign of the
difference of the ranks. A comparison
of the popularity of SOSM (Example 2)
and EADAM (Example 3) for students
is shown in Table 9. A similar popular-
ity metric can be derived for the course
organizers.
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4.3.3 Rank Distribution
The rank distribution compares how
many students were assigned to their first
choice, how many to their second choice,
and so on. Similarly, for courses it com-
pares how many students were assigned
to the first choice of a course. Table 10
shows a comparison of SOSM (Exam-
ple 2) and EADAM (Example 3) for stu-
dents S (left) and courses C (right) with
the rank distribution metric.
4.4 Results of the First Field Experiment
With the preferences of the 136 students
from the first field experiment and the
data about the courses we ran SOSM and
EADAM in order to compute a matching
of the students and courses. We first pro-
vide a comparison, where course organiz-
ers do not have preferences, and a second
comparison, where we generated prefer-
ences of course organizers over students
(see Sect. 4.2). Note that without pref-
erences of group organizers there is no
difference between SOSM and EADAM.
Students will only be rejected when the
group is full. This means that no student
will be tentatively placed into a group
when other students are rejected from
that group and the former is later on
also rejected from that group. If there
are no interrupters, the preferences of
the students will not be changed and
EADAM will stop in step 1, thus return-
ing the same result as SOSM. However,
we decided to report both results (SOSM
and EADAM) in both subsections for
completeness.
4.4.1 No Preferences of Course
Organizers
The average rank metric (Table 11) shows
that both SOSM and EADAM result in
better matchings than the FCFS, even
though the differences are small. The
shorthand n/p refers to students being
assigned to courses that they have no
preference for. If these courses are un-
acceptable, these students will not be
matched.
The popularity metric in Table 12
also shows the superiority of SOSM and
EADAM.
The rank distribution metric
(Table 13) demonstrates that 114 stu-
dents would be matched to their first
preference with SOSM or EADAM,
whereas only 105 are matched to the first
Table 9 Comparison of student popularity of SOSM and EADAM
Student SOSM EADAM Rank
difference
Preference
Rank of
assigned course
Rank of
assigned course
s1 2 2 0 SOSM ∼ EADAM
s2 2 1 1 SOSM ≺ EADAM
s3 2 1 1 SOSM ≺ EADAM
s4 2 1 1 SOSM ≺ EADAM
Popularity SOSM ≺ EADAM
Table 10 Comparison of rank distribution of SOSM and EADAM for students and
courses
Students Courses
Rank SOSM EADAM Rank SOSM EADAM
# Students # Students # Students # Students
1 0 3 1 4 1
2 4 1 2 0 2
3 0 1
Table 11 Students’ average ranks of FCFS, SOSM, and EADAM without group
preferences
FCFS SOSM EADAM
Average rank 1.31 (5 n/p) 1.25 (6 n/p) 1.25 (6 n/p)
Table 12 Student popularity of FCFS, SOSM, and EADAM without group prefer-
ences
FCFS vs. SOSM FCFS vs. EADAM SOSM vs. EADAM
#Students  16 16 0
#Students ≺ 20 20 0
Popularity FCFS ≺ SOSM FCFS ≺ EADAM SOSM ∼ EADAM
Table 13 Student rank distribution of FCFS, SOSM, and EADAM without group
preferences
Rank FCFS SOSM EADAM
1 105 (77.2 %) 114 (83.8 %) 114 (83.8 %)
2 13 (9.6 %) 5 (3.7 %) 5 (3.7 %)
3 12 (8.8 %) 6 (4.4 %) 6 (4.4 %)
4 – 4 (2.9 %) 4 (2.9 %)
5 1 (0.7 %) 1 (0.7 %) 1 (0.7 %)
n/p 5 (3.7 %) 6 (4.4 %) 6 (4.4 %)
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preference in the first-come-first-served
course allocation system.
Note that the first-come-first-served
course allocation system assigned 5 stu-
dents to a group for which the stu-
dents have no preference (n/p), SOSM
or EADAM would assign 6 students to
a group for which they have no pref-
erence as they require a stable match-
ing. Typically, it is because of students
who submit only a small number of
course preferences, who are assigned a
course for which they have provided no
preference. Nevertheless, this illustrates
that FCFS can lead to more students
being matched to a course for which
they have provided a preference, com-
pared to SOSM and EADAM. Other than
that, the metrics show that SOSM and
EADAM result in better matchings than
the first-come-first-served course alloca-
tion system when no group preferences
exist.
4.4.2 With Preferences of Course
Organizers
In order to compare the matching mech-
anisms with preferences of course orga-
nizers we generated random group pref-
erences with indifferences over the 136
students. The following results show the
mean of 400 runs with the generated
group preferences with indifferences.
As can be expected, FCFS yields unsta-
ble results. Unstable means that blocking
pairs of unmatched students and schools
exist, who would prefer to be matched
with each other rather than their cur-
rent assignment. We have identified 25
blocking pairs (18 % of all students) on
average.
Students For the students the aver-
age rank metric (Table 14) shows that
EADAM would provide the best results.
On the same metric, SOSM would result
in a better matching than FCFS.
In contrast to the average rank met-
ric, the popularity metric (see Table 15)
shows a different result for the compar-
ison of the FCFS course allocation sys-
tem and SOSM. In this case FCFS is more
popular than SOSM. This discrepancy is
due to the fact that the 19.19 students
(mean of 400 runs) who were better off
with SOSM were matched to a much
better ranked group than the 19.33 stu-
dents being better off with FCFS. Hence
the average rank for SOSM is lower than
for FCFS. Still, EADAM shows the best
results.
Table 14 Student average ranks of FCFS, SOSM, and EADAMwith generated group
preferences
FCFS SOSM EADAM
Average rank 1.31 (5 n/p) 1.28 (6.88 n/p) 1.26 (6.88 n/p)
Table 15 Student popularity of FCFS, SOSM, and EADAM with generated group
preferences
FCFS vs. SOSM FCFS vs. EADAM SOSM vs. EADAM
#Students  19.33 18.23 0.00
#Students ≺ 19.19 19.76 2.40
Popularity FCFS  SOSM FCFS ≺ EADAM SOSM ≺ EADAM
Table 16 Student rank distribution of FCFS, SOSM, and EADAM with generated
group preferences
Rank FCFS SOSM EADAM
1 105 (77.2 %) 106.4 (78.2 %) 108.6 (79.8 %)
2 13 (9.6 %) 12.2 (9.0 %) 10.5 (7.7 %)
3 12 (8.8 %) 8.3 (6.1 %) 7.9 (5.8 %)
4 – 1.9 (1.4 %) 1.8 (1.3 %)
5 1 (0.7 %) 0.3 (0.2 %) 0.3 (0.2 %)
6 – 0.1 (0.1 %) 0.1 (0.1 %)
n/p 5 (3.7 %) 6.9 (5.1 %) 6.9 (5.1 %)
Table 17 Group average ranks of FCFS, SOSM, and EADAM with generated group
preferences
FCFS SOSM EADAM
Average rank 66.90 (0 n/p) 63.33 (0 n/p) 64.44 (0 n/p)
Table 18 Group popularity of FCFS, SOSM, and EADAM with generated group
preferences
FCFS vs. SOSM FCFS vs. EADAM SOSM vs. EADAM
#Courses  3.62 3.69 2.02
#Courses ≺ 4.38 4.31 0.84
Popularity FCFS ≺ SOSM FCFS ≺ EADAM SOSM  EADAM
The same result as the average rank
metric is found based on the rank distri-
bution metric in Table 16 with EADAM
matching the most students to their first
preference.
With preferences of course organizers,
EADAM results in the best matching for
the students.
Courses For the courses the average
rank metric (Table 17) shows that SOSM
produces the best matchings regarding
the preferences of course organizers, but
SOSM and EADAM would both be pre-
ferred over FCFS by course organizers.
The same observation can also be made
with regard to the popularity metric that
is shown in Table 18.
The reason why EADAM is less prefer-
able for the course organizers is because
it aims to increase the welfare of the
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students when it makes improvements
of the students. Also, the rank distribu-
tion metric (Table 19) shows that course
organizers would prefer SOSM.
Overall, EADAM and SOSM would re-
sult in the better outcomes than FCFS
for both students and course organiz-
ers, with or without preferences of course
organizers in this field experiment.
4.5 Results of the Second Field
Experiment
In the second field experiment, we again
analyze situations with or without pref-
erences of group organizers. The second
experiment is larger and we wanted to
understand if the results from the first
experiment carry over.
4.5.1 No Preferences of Course
Organizers
The average rank metric (Table 20) shows
that with FCFS the students would be
assigned to their 2.91th choice on aver-
age with 38 students being assigned to a
course for which they have no preference
(n/p). However, with SOSM or EADAM
the students would be assigned to their
1.78th choice and 53 students would be
assigned to a course for which they have
no preference.
The popularity metric is shown in Ta-
ble 21, which demonstrates that both
SOSM and EADAM would be more pop-
ular than FCFS: Only 90 students would
prefer FCFS to SOSM or EADAM, but
146 would prefer SOSM or EADAM to
the first-come-first-served course alloca-
tion system.
If we look at the rank distribution met-
ric (see Table 22) it shows that with
SOSM or EADAM 280 students would
be assigned to their first choice, whereas
only 223 got their first choice with
the first-come-first-served course alloca-
tion system. The first-come-first-served
course allocation system assigned 38 stu-
dents to a group for which the stu-
dents have no preference (n/p), SOSM
or EADAM would assign 53 students to
a group for which they have no prefer-
ence. The reason for this could be the
fact, that many students submitted very
few preferences, as we saw in Fig. 2.
The three metrics, average rank, pop-
ularity, and rank distribution all show
that without group preferences, SOSM or
EADAM would result in a better match-
Table 19 Group rank distribution of FCFS, SOSM, and EADAM with generated
group preferences
Rank FCFS SOSM EADAM
1 1.1 (0.8 %) 1.2 (0.9 %) 1.1 (0.8 %)
2 1.0 (0.7 %) 1.1 (0.8 %) 1.1 (0.8 %)
3 0.9 (0.7 %) 1.1 (0.8 %) 1.1 (0.8 %)
4 1.0 (0.7 %) 1.0 (0.7 %) 1.1 (0.8 %)
5 1.1 (0.8 %) 1.1 (0.8 %) 1.2 (0.9 %)
6 1.1 (0.8 %) 1.1 (0.8 %) 1.0 (0.7 %)
7 1.1 (0.8 %) 1.1 (0.8 %) 1.1 (0.8 %)
8 1.2 (0.9 %) 1.3 (1.0 %) 1.2 (0.9 %)
9 1.0 (0.7 %) 1.0 (0.7 %) 1.0 (0.7 %)
10 1.1 (0.8 %) 1.1 (0.8 %) 1.2 (0.9 %)
11–20 10.8 (7.9 %) 11.7 (8.6 %) 11.3 (8.3 %)
21–30 10.3 (7.6 %) 11.5 (8.5 %) 10.9 (8.0 %)
31–50 19.9 (14.7 %) 21.8 (16.1 %) 21.2 (15.6 %)
51–100 50.9 (37.4 %) 50.9 (37.5 %) 51.1 (37.6 %)
101–136 33.5 (24.6 %) 28.8 (21.2 %) 30.2 (22.2 %)
Table 20 Student average ranks of FCFS, SOSM, and EADAM without group
preferences
FCFS SOSM EADAM
Average rank 2.91 (38 n/p) 1.78 (53 n/p) 1.78 (53 n/p)
Table 21 Student popularity of FCFS, SOSM and EADAM without group prefer-
ences
FCFS vs. SOSM FCFS vs. EADAM SOSM vs. EADAM
#Students  90 90 0
#Students ≺ 146 146 0
Popularity FCFS ≺ SOSM FCFS ≺ EADAM SOSM ∼ EADAM
ing for the students. Again, a disadvan-
tage is the higher number of students
matched to a group for which they do not
have a preference, this is a consequence of
the fact that students often only provided
preferences for a few courses.
4.5.2 With Preferences of Course
Organizers
In this case FCFS induces 189 blocking
pairs (45 % of all students) on average,
meaning that 189 pairs of student and
school could improve their assignment
by switching.
Students The average ranks for students
if course organizers have preferences are
shown in Table 23. Using SOSM instead
of FCFS the average rank improvement
for each student would be 0.73. With
EADAM rather than FCFS the average
rank improvement would be 0.87. This
does not mean that every student would
improve by 0.87 ranks. Some might not
improve or even worsen, and some would
improve by more than one rank.
The popularity metric (see Table 24)
leads to the same result as the average
rank metric with EADAM showing the
best results for the students.
As shown in Table 25 the rank distribu-
tion metric provides the same results as
the popularity metric. EADAM matches
almost 75 % of the students to their
top three preferred courses while SOSM
shows worse results than FCFS. The com-
parison of FCFS and SOSM shows that
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Table 22 Student rank distribution of FCFS, SOSM, and EADAM without group
preferences
Rank FCFS SOSM EADAM
1 223 (53.3 %) 280 (67.0 %) 280 (67.0 %)
2 30 (7.2 %) 25 (6.0 %) 25 (6.0 %)
3 31 (7.4 %) 18 (4.3 %) 18 (4.3 %)
4 30 (7.2 %) 14 (3.3 %) 14 (3.3 %)
5 18 (4.3 %) 7 (1.7 %) 7 (1.7 %)
6 8 (1.9 %) 4 (1.0 %) 4 (1.0 %)
7 13 (3.1 %) 7 (1.7 %) 7 (1.7 %)
8 4 (1.0 %) 2 (0.5 %) 2 (0.5 %)
9 5 (1.2 %) 1 (0.2 %) 1 (0.2 %)
10 6 (1.4 %) 3 (0.7 %) 3 (0.7 %)
11 1 (0.2 %) 1 (0.2 %) 1 (0.2 %)
12 1 (0.2 %) 2 (0.5 %) 2 (0.5 %)
13 1 (0.2 %) 1 (0.2 %) 1 (0.2 %)
16 2 (0.5 %) – –
17 1 (0.2 %) – –
19 1 (0.2 %) – –
20 2 (0.5 %) – –
23 1 (0.2 %) – –
35 1 (0.2 %) – –
41 1 (0.2 %) – –
n/p 38 (9.1 %) 53 (12.7 %) 53 (12.7 %)
Table 23 Student average ranks of FCFS, SOSM, and EADAMwith generated group
preferences
FCFS SOSM EADAM
Average rank 2.91 (38 n/p) 2.18 (51.26 n/p) 2.04 (51.24 n/p)
Table 24 Student popularity of FCFS, SOSM, and EADAM with generated group
preferences
FCFS vs. SOSM FCFS vs. EADAM SOSM vs. EADAM
#Students  125.81 115.99 0.00
#Students ≺ 138.39 141.04 27.35
Popularity FCFS ≺ SOSM FCFS ≺ EADAM SOSM ≺ EADAM
with FCFS slightly more students are
matched to their course of first choice
than with SOSM, but looking at the top
three choices, SOSM shows the better re-
sults. Similar to the results in Sect. 4.5.1
with SOSM and EADAM, more students
would be matched to courses they do not
have preferences for (n/p).
The significant differences between the
results of SOSM and EADAM emphasize
the welfare losses for students that could
be produced by SOSM.
The difference in the results for the
students without group preferences
(Sect. 4.5.1) is due to the fact that the
group preferences affect the assignment
process. For the case with group prefer-
ences a student could be rejected from a
course after being tentatively assigned to
it. This could not happen without group
preferences.
Courses The average rank metric (see
Table 26) for courses shows that both
SOSM and EADAM result in better
matchings for the courses with SOSM
as the better alternative. It is clear that
SOSM and EADAM provide better results
than the first-come-first-served course
allocation system, since they are consid-
ering the group preferences. The better
result of SOSM versus EADAM can again
be explained by the fact that EADAM
is improving the welfare of the stu-
dents, thus negatively affecting the course
organizers.
Table 27 provides the popularity met-
ric for the courses. The outcomes are the
same as we saw with the average rank
metric. Accordingly, SOSM brings the
best results for the courses and it is more
popular than the other two mechanisms.
In Table 28 the rank distribution for
courses is provided. For example, using
SOSM, 15.6 students (3.7 %) would be
matched to the top 10 ranks of a course.
Also in that case, the results show that
SOSM would be the best matching mech-
anism for the courses with EADAM, pro-
viding better results than the first-come-
first-served course allocation system.
Overall, EADAM resulted in better
outcomes than FCFS for students and
courses with or without preferences of
course organizers. The experiments pro-
vide some useful information. First, the
results suggest that EADAM is the pre-
ferred alternative, although the differ-
ences are not substantial. Second, there
are trade-offs and the stable matching
mechanism, on average, has more stu-
dents unmatched, which might be an
important criterion in some applications.
5 Towards Multiunit
and Combinatorial Assignments
Course assignment has become a popu-
lar research topic with many recent devel-
opments, due to applications being wide-
spread. One non-trivial extension that re-
searchers have considered only recently
are minimum quotas for courses. This
is practically relevant if course organiz-
ers want to avoid situations where they
have only a few students in their class. It
is known, that there is no strategy-proof
mechanism that completely eliminates
justified envy when minimum quotas are
imposed (Hamada et al. 2011). Ueda
et al. (2012) recently proposed strategy-
proof mechanisms, which allow for min-
imum quotas and achieve efficiency with
a weaker notion of stability.
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Many of the new developments have
been on the assignment of multiple
course seats to one student, i.e., the mul-
tiunit assignment problem or combinato-
rial assignment problem, resp. Budish and
Cantillon (2012) analyze multiunit as-
signment problems, where students don’t
only want to get a single space on a
course, and their preferences are ordi-
nal and responsive. Responsiveness de-
scribes a form of separability of prefer-
ences about different courses: if a student
prefers one course c over the other, c′, he
or she also prefers a bundle of courses X∪
{c} to a bundle of courses X ∪ {c′}. Theo-
retical analyses show that serial dictator-
ships are the only strategy-proof and ef-
ficient mechanisms for this problem (Pá-
pai 2001; Ehlers and Klaus 2003). Unfor-
tunately, they lead to highly unfair out-
comes in which some students get all the
courses they like most, whereas others
only a few. Budish and Cantillon (2012)
suggest a mechanism with proxy agents,
which tries to achieve fairness of the dis-
tribution and efficiency at the expense of
strategy-proofness.
The combinatorial assignment problem
can be seen as an extension of the mul-
tiunit assignment problem, where a set of
spaces on a course are allocated amongst
a set of agents with preferences over bun-
dles of course seats in different courses.
Each student wants to get 0 or 1 spaces
in a course, but his or her preferences
for particular bundles of courses might
be substitutes or complements as op-
posed to the responsive preferences as-
sumed in the multiunit assignment prob-
lem. This is similar to a combinatorial
auction in which no monetary transfers
are allowed. In recent work by Budish
(2011) a mechanism is suggested, which
adapts the idea of Competitive Equilib-
rium from Equal Incomes (Varian 1976)
to environments with indivisible goods
and proofs approximations of efficiency,
strategy-proofness, and fairness proper-
ties. Othman et al. (2010) describe com-
putational methods to implement the
mechanism.
Another interesting extension of SOSM
in the context of the hospitals/residents
problem is the consideration of couples.
The set of residents also includes cou-
ples who must be assigned together, ei-
ther to the same hospital or to a spe-
cific pair of hospitals chosen by the cou-
ple. The addition of couples to the hospi-
tals/residents problem renders the prob-
lem NP-complete (Gusfield and Irving
1989).
Table 25 Student rank distribution of FCFS, SOSM, and EADAM with generated
group preferences
Rank FCFS SOSM EADAM
1 223 (53.3 %) 219.9 (52.6 %) 236.5 (56.6 %)
2 30 (7.2 %) 52.5 (12.6 %) 46.2 (11.1 %)
3 31 (7.4 %) 29.8 (7.1 %) 27.0 (6.5 %)
4 30 (7.2 %) 23.4 (5.6 %) 21.6 (5.2 %)
5 18 (4.3 %) 13.4 (3.2 %) 11.4 (2.7 %)
6 8 (1.9 %) 8.8 (2.1 %) 7.4 (1.8 %)
7 13 (3.1 %) 6.0 (1.4 %) 5.4 (1.3 %)
8 4 (1 %) 4.6 (1.1 %) 3.9 (0.9 %)
9 5 (1.2 %) 2.7 (0.6 %) 2.3 (0.6 %)
10 6 (1.4 %) 2.3 (0.6 %) 1.9 (0.5 %)
11 1 (0.2 %) 0.8 (0.2 %) 0.6 (0.1 %)
12 1 (0.2 %) 1.1 (0.3 %) 1.1 (0.3 %)
13 1 (0.2 %) 0.6 (0.1 %) 0.5 (0.1 %)
14 – 0.1 (0 %) 0.1 (0 %)
15 – 0.3 (0.1 %) 0.2 (0 %)
16 2 (0.5 %) 0.1 (0 %) 0.1 (0 %)
17 1 (0.2 %) 0.2 (0 %) 0.2 (0 %)
19 1 (0.2 %) 0.1 (0 %) 0.1 (0 %)
20 2 (0.5 %) 0.1 (0 %) 0.1 (0 %)
23 1 (0.2 %) – –
35 1 (0.2 %) – –
41 1 (0.2 %) – –
n/p 38 (9.1 %) 51.3 (12.3 %) 51.2 (12.3 %)
Table 26 Group average ranks of FCFS, SOSM, and EADAM with generated group
preferences
FCFS SOSM EADAM
Average rank 198.66 (0 n/p) 178.57 (0 n/p) 186.78 (0 n/p)
Table 27 Group popularity of FCFS, SOSM, and EADAM with generated group
preferences
FCFS vs. SOSM FCFS vs. EADAM SOSM vs. EADAM
#Courses  17.00 17.72 18.85
#Courses ≺ 28.00 27.28 6.10
Popularity FCFS ≺ SOSM FCFS ≺ EADAM SOSM  EADAM
6 Conclusion
We have discussed established and more
recent algorithmic developments for
course allocation problems. The Gale-
Shapley student optimal stable mech-
anism (SOSM) is a well-established
matching mechanism which is applied
for the assignment of students to pub-
lic universities in the U.S. and in the
school choice problems, for instance.
While it is strategy-proof for students
and stable, SOSM may not always be
efficient. Kesten’s efficiency adjusted de-
ferred acceptance mechanism (EADAM)
(Kesten 2010) eliminates welfare losses
on the students’ side, at the expense of
strategy-proofness. It is a bit surpris-
ing that these algorithms have found
little application in the large number
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Table 28 Group rank distribution of FCFS, SOSM, and EADAM with generated
group preferences
Rank FCFS SOSM EADAM
1 1.3 (0.3 %) 1.7 (0.4 %) 1.4 (0.3 %)
2 1.1 (0.3 %) 1.6 (0.4 %) 1.3 (0.3 %)
3 1.2 (0.3 %) 1.4 (0.3 %) 1.3 (0.3 %)
4 1.2 (0.3 %) 1.6 (0.4 %) 1.5 (0.4 %)
5 1.3 (0.3 %) 1.6 (0.4 %) 1.5 (0.4 %)
6 1.2 (0.3 %) 1.4 (0.3 %) 1.3 (0.3 %)
7 1.2 (0.3 %) 1.6 (0.4 %) 1.2 (0.3 %)
8 1.3 (0.3 %) 1.6 (0.4 %) 1.4 (0.3 %)
9 1.2 (0.3 %) 1.4 (0.3 %) 1.3 (0.3 %)
10 1.1 (0.3 %) 1.7 (0.4 %) 1.4 (0.3 %)
11–20 11.7 (2.8 %) 15.8 (3.8 %) 13.4 (3.2 %)
21–30 12.2 (2.9 %) 16.8 (4 %) 14.0 (3.3 %)
31–50 23.1 (5.5 %) 29.5 (7.1 %) 26.3 (6.3 %)
51–100 54.9 (13.1 %) 61.0 (14.6 %) 58.6 (14 %)
101–150 52.7 (12.6 %) 53.1 (12.7 %) 53.3 (12.7 %)
151–200 51.5 (12.3 %) 50.8 (12.2 %) 51.3 (12.3 %)
201–300 99.9 (23.9 %) 91.5 (21.9 %) 96.6 (23.1 %)
301–418 100.0 (23.9 %) 84.0 (20.1 %) 91.0 (21.8 %)
of matching problems in university en-
vironments so far and first-come-first-
served (FCFS) approaches are still in
wide-spread use.
In this paper, we provided a brief sur-
vey of this field, which has seen a num-
ber of recent advances. In addition, we
discussed the results of two field exper-
iments, in which we compare an FCFS
mechanism with SOSM and EADAM.
The FCFS matching and the matchings of
SOSM and EADAM were compared us-
ing average rank metrics, popularity, and
rank distribution metrics. By and large,
the outcomes of stable matching mecha-
nisms were preferable to FCFS in both ex-
periments, however, the differences were
not substantial. Actually, the number of
unmatched students was lower in FCFS
throughout. For practitioners it is worth-
while to understand the different de-
sign desiderata and metrics before in-
troducing a new matching mechanism.
Still, one of the biggest advantages of
SOSM and EADAM, beyond the stabil-
ity of the outcomes, may be the fact
that there are strong incentives for telling
the truth and there are no benefits to
being first during the registration pe-
riod, which might lead to unfair out-
comes as some students can just not be
first due to circumstances beyond their
control.
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